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FIFA 1975-2000: the Business of a Football  
Development Organisation 
Christiane Eisenberg ∗ 
Abstract: The Fédération Internationale de Football Asso-
ciation (FIFA) is the governing body of world football and 
in this capacity has assumed the role of a global player in 
the relationship between sport and politics. While in the 
1960s and 70s the organisation produced a growing number 
of political scandals in world football it has demonstrated a 
quite effective method of dealing with these problems in 
more recent times. The article develops the argument that 
this change for the better is a concomitant of the fact that 
FIFA, from the 1980s on, is also an extremely dynamic 
business profiting from the sale of TV rights for the World 
Cup. This interpretation seeks to understand the role of 
FIFA as a business against the background of its football 
development programmes which have made the world soc-
cer federation a most effective International Non-Govern-
mental Organisation. Today, these football development 
programmes are shaping the way the leading persons in 
FIFA’s Zurich headquarters are defining their policies. 
However, this development has had its price, because it has 
given rise to serious internal political conflicts within FIFA. 
As a consequence, the organisation’s politics of global inte-
gration are extremely vulnerable. 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Christiane Eisenberg, Großbritannien-Zentrum der Hum-
boldt-Universität, Jägerstr. 10-11, 10117 Berlin, Deutschland; 
e-mail: christiane.eisenberg@rz.hu-berlin.de. 
 
This is a revised paper given at the Annual Conference of the American Historical Associa-
tion in Seattle, WA, 8 January 2005, and at the 1. European Congress for World and Global 
History, Leipzig, 24 September 2005. I am grateful to the audiences for their critical discus-
sion. 
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FIFA in a World of Nation States 
The full name of FIFA is: La Fédération Internationale de Football Association. 
The organisation was founded in 1904 by a few cosmopolitan football officials 
from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Denmark, Sweden 
and Germany in order to unify the interpretation of the rules and set up a major 
European tournament. Even before the outbreak of the First World War soccer 
associations from North and South America, Australia, Africa and Asia had 
signed up with FIFA. This explains why the long-awaited international football 
tournament, which took place in 1930 in Uruguay, was presented from the start 
as the ‘World Cup’. Today FIFA comprises football associations from 207 
countries. In other words the organisation has grown to cover every corner of 
the globe and has more members than the United Nations Organisation (UNO). 
The greatest growth in membership occurred after 1945 when the principle 
of the nation state began to predominate all over the world.1 More than one 
hundred former colonies, break-away territories and a wide variety of other 
political communities became independent nation states. All were founded on a 
similar pattern. The countries involved claimed their own sovereignty and the 
right to make their own laws within their own borders. They issued their own 
currency, organised postal services, and set up their own police force and army 
to ensure law and order at home and in their dealings with outside states. In 
order to be integrated as equal partners in the society of world states the indi-
vidual nations aspired to be included in international organisations – one of 
which was FIFA.2 
For the young states being a member of FIFA was all the more attractive 
since the organisation had been striving for global representation since the end 
of the First World War. For this reason its conditions for membership were, by 
tradition, generous. Whereas, for example, it took until 1960 for UNO to pass a 
‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples’,3 FIFA was by then in the process of accepting football associations from 
dependent political communities on condition that the national membership 
organisation of the state containing this community voted in favour of admis-
                                                             
1  While exactly 60 national associations had joined FIFA in the fourty-years period from 
1904-1944, the next group of about 60 member associations (to be precise, the size was 63) 
needed only a period of twenty years (1945-64). Numbers counted from Heidrun Homburg, 
“National Associations – Foundation Year”, unpublished ms., FIFA Centennial Project. 
2  Cf. John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, “World 
Society and the Nation State”, American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 144-181. In the 
period 1870-1945 only 17 former dependent political unities succeed in forming a nation 
state; between1945-1987 this occurred 113 times; cf. David Strang, “From dependency to 
sovereignty: an event history of decolonization 1870-1987”, American Sociological Review 
55 (1999): 846-860, here 855. 
3  This declaration is seen as the official start of UNO’s decolonization policies; cf. Strang 
850. 
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sion and put in a corresponding application.4 Amongst the countries which 
joined FIFA earlier than UNO on the basis of this ruling were Kenya, Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Cyprus, Malaysia, Singapore and Syria.5  
The huge number of new members also had a negative side. For the growth 
in membership meant that there was also a growth in member associations from 
politically dubious states. True, in the decades after World War II there were a 
number of states in Europe, South America and Asia – Portugal, Spain, Greece; 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay; the Philippines, South Korea – which threw aside 
their authoritarian regimes in favour of democratic constitutional forms of 
government. Outside the OECD states, however, there were very few states 
which enjoyed a constitution. A survey taken in 1979 showed that, of the 119 
states examined, only 35 fulfilled the criteria of ‘democracy’ and ‘constitu-
tional state’. The majority of world states were under a centrally-organised one-
man rule.6 
Against this background FIFA’s generous admission practices were at the 
same time a deliberate renunciation of any policy to examine the political na-
ture of member associations, and its reputation began to suffer from the severe 
structural problem of any democratic umbrella organisation: the inability to 
exert influence on the political constitution of individual member associations. 
While small organisations with a local scope are able to select their members, 
organisations with a worldwide competency and responsibility are not. Thus, 
FIFA took no action against corrupt politicians who viewed football as a power 
basis (as in the dictatorships in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay), turned a blind 
eye to the links between clubs and drug cartels (as in Columbia), and did noth-
ing to prevent association presidents being appointed from above (as in Eastern 
block countries or some former colonies).7 It even failed to pillory them in 
                                                             
4  See FIFA Archive Zurich, Minutes of the Extraordinary Congress held on 14th and 15th 
November 1953, 6-7.  
5  These examples are educed from comparing the following information: Heidrun Homburg, 
“FIFA-Confederations & Affiliated National Associations 1904-2004 – Year of Affilia-
tion”, unpublished ms., FIFA Centennial Project; Frank R. Pfetsch, Internationale Politik 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994) 89, und “Die Entwicklung der Mitgliedschaft in den Verein-
ten Nationen 1945-2002”, online, internet, 11 Dec. 2005, available: 
 http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/de/library_20040506.html (the year of UNO admission); 
Elihu Katz, and George Wedell, Broadcasting in the Third World. Promise and Perform-
ance (London and Basingstoke: Sage, 1978) Tab. A 1 (year of independence). 
6  Cf. Tatu Vanhanen, The Emergence of Democracy. A Comparative Study of 119 States, 
1850-1979, Commentationes Scientiarium Socialium 24 (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 
1984) 42. See also the general discussion in Juan J. Linz, Totalitäre und autoritäre Regime 
(Berlin: Berliner Debatte Wissenschaftsverlag, 2000) XXXVIII-XLI. 
7  For these and further examples see Eduardo Archetti, and Amilcar Romero, “Death and 
Violence in Argentinian Football”, Football Violence and Social Identity, eds. Richard 
Giulianotti, Norman Bonney, and Mike Hepworth (London: Routledge, 1994) 37-72; Vic 
Duke, and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argen-
tina”, Sport in Latin American Society. Past and Present, eds. J.A. Mangan, and Lamartine 
P. DaCosta, The International Journal of the History of Sport 18.3 (London: Cass, 2001) 
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public. As a consequence the original maxim behind the organisation’s activi-
ties – ‘no politics’ – had gradually developed into a statement of political bank-
ruptcy. 
In the 1960s and 70s world public opinion began to be more critical towards 
authoritarian regimes and more sensitive to the question of human rights8. This 
in turn produced a growing number of political conflicts in world football and 
the FIFA leadership blundered from one political botch-up to the next. For 
example in the 1960s the British president of FIFA, Sir Stanley Rous, was an 
open supporter of the policies of the Football Association of South Africa 
which arranged its fixtures along the lines of the Apartheid system. In 1973 
FIFA’s general-secretary Käser let himself be persuaded by the Pinochet re-
gime in Chile that the misuse of the National Stadium as a torture prison was 
no impediment to it being considered as the venue for a World Cup knock-out 
match. And in 1978 FIFA ruined its political image in a hugely effective man-
ner by allowing the Argentinean football association to organise the World 
Cup. The Association had applied to present the tournament during the years of 
the democratically elected Peron government, but by this time it had been taken 
over by the military dictatorship of General Videla.9 
That said, there then followed a miraculous reform and there were no further 
political embarrassments – which brings me to my theme. Starting in the 1980s 
the decisive posts in FIFA have been occupied by politically sensitive persons 
with a global political outlook and officials began to take seriously the anti-
racism clause of the official statutes. FIFA was also spared from the actions of 
the many different sporting boycott movement of the time which caused im-
mense problems for such bodies as the International Olympic Committee. And 
finally it was able to get the above-mentioned organisational problem under 
control. In 1999 a National Associations Committee was set up, complete with 
inspectors and inspection tours along the lines of UNO. This body scrutinizes 
all applications for membership and intervenes with any member associations 
whenever politicians attempt to interfere with football or when there are any 
deviations from democratic standards. This FIFA ‘police force’ is a quite re-
markable and – as far as I know – a unique institution in the world of interna-
                                                                                                                                
93-116; Richard Giulianotti, “Fußball in Südamerika: Globalisierung, Neoliberalismus und 
die Politik der Korruption”, Global Players – Kultur, Ökonomie und Politik des Fußballs, 
eds. Michael Fanizadeh, Gerald Hödl, and Wolfram Manzenreiter (Frankfurt/M.: Brandes 
& Apsel / Südwind, 2002) 159-182; James Riordan, “Rußland und Sowjetunion”, Fußball, 
soccer, calcio. Ein englischer Sport auf seinem Weg um die Welt, ed. Christiane Eisenberg 
(München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1997) 130-148, here 142 ff. 
8  Vgl. John Boli, and Frank J. Lechner, “Globalization and World Culture”, International 
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, eds. Neil J. Smelser, and Paul B. Bal-
tes,vol. 9 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001) Sp. 6261-6266; Michael Herzka, Die Menschen-
rechtsbewegung in der Weltgesellschaft (Bern: Peter Lang, 1995). 
9  Cf. in greater detail Pierre Lanfranchi, Christiane Eisenberg, Tony Mason, and Alfred 
Wahl, 100 Years of Football. The FIFA Centennial Book (London: Weidenfeld & Nichol-
son, 2004) 286-289. 
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tional sporting organisations. In fact I do not know of any other organisation 
with a comparable capacity for intervention.  
How can this astonishing development be explained? Of course, the fact that 
FIFA has learnt valuable lessons from negative experiences plays a role. Like-
wise generation changes in the leadership since the 1960s have contributed to a 
more enlightened spirit within the official body. Typically in the 1974 election 
for the post of President the above-mentioned Englishman Sir Stanley Rous 
lost out to his Brazilian opponent João Havelange, who was a resolute oppo-
nent of any form of racism and an advocate of multi-cultural coexistence be-
tween the developed and the developing countries. However the decisive point 
seems to me to be the fact that since the mid-1970s FIFA has pressed ahead 
with the commercialisation and professionalisation of international football. In 
this way it has systematically extended its financial resources as well as its 
global radius of action and adopted a new definition of its duties. I would argue 
that this has been all the more successful since, during this period, certain spe-
cific political conditions in the global body politic have changed in its favour. 
I should now like to analyse this particular conjuncture of various factors. At 
the same time I should like to make clear that this development has also had its 
price, because it has given rise to serious internal political conflicts within 
FIFA; and even today the organisation’s politics of global integration are ex-
tremely vulnerable. 
From a Sports Governing Body to a Global Business 
When FIFA was founded in 1904, it was ‘designed’ to be an international 
sports organisation and was supposed to administer rules and regulate competi-
tive matches, as did similar organisations for other sports. It only began to 
extend its duties in the 1970s when football officials from the new member 
nations, particularly Africa, extended the interpretation of article 2 of the FIFA 
statutes “to promote the game of association football in every way it deems fit”. 
These officials put up corresponding demands in order to benefit the so-called 
Third World Countries which, according to their argument, had “a right to 
obtain higher financial assistance corresponding to the real needs of our conti-
nent”.10 To meet these demands, FIFA began to engage more and more profes-
sional staff and grew to a business on a global scale with a vastly expanded 
financial basis: at first via sponsoring contracts with Coca Cola, Adidas and 
other firms, and later with the help of its own merchandising activities.11 From 
the 1980s onwards the organisation enjoyed an unexpectedly high level of 
                                                             
10  FIFA Archive Zurich, Technical Development Committee, Meeting Nr. 13, 18.8.1972 
(Enclosure), letter of CAF president Yidnekatchev Tessema to the chairman of the Techni-
cal Development Committee, 5 July 1972. 
11  Cf. Lanfranchi et al. 242-250. 
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income from TV rights for the World Cup. This in turn was directly connected 
with an extraordinarily dynamic development in FIFA’s business activities.12 
From the start FIFA conducted its business activities on a profit basis. This 
approach was fostered by the new president João Havelange. It soon aroused 
much criticism from observers who accused the organisation of operating as a 
capitalist entertainment business: FIFA’s commercial activities had turned 
football into a “millionaire’s gambling casino” and had misused the organisa-
tion as a licence to print money. These and similar allegations were put forward 
by expert authors and sociologists who had used methods of investigative jour-
nalism to expose financial transactions of considerable size.13 
Has FIFA indeed been perverted into a capitalist business as the critics al-
lege? My answer to this question is ‘no’, and therefore I should like to develop 
an alternative interpretation in this paper. 
FIFA as a Business Enterprise 
At first sight the description of FIFA as a capitalist business enterprise might 
appear to be fairly accurate, particularly since FIFA’s business activities have 
expanded to take advantage of the commercialisation of football. But looked at 
more closely there are some deviations from this alleged mode of operations. 
True, FIFA’s approach to business has been thoroughly capitalistic in that it 
has accumulated income for internal uses. Nevertheless its principles of profit 
distribution have been (and still are) unorthodox. 
By contrast with joint stock companies, for example, surpluses are not dis-
tributed according to the size of the initial investment capital. The beneficiaries 
are much more the member associations who are treated equally or according 
to their needs. Thus FIFA conducts its dealings more like cooperative busi-
nesses and other self-administrated companies in the classical labour move-
ment where dividends are not a reward for the capital invested but are used to 
                                                             
12  In the 1970s those responsible had grossly underestimated the potential inherent in the sale 
of rights. For example, in the Proposition for the Organisation of a World Junior Tourna-
ment published on 26.3.1975 we read: “[B]ut here only small incomes may be expected”; 
see FIFA Archive Zurich, Technical Development Committee, Agenda for sitting number 
18 of 27.8.1975.  
13  These “discoveries” often included data freely available to the general public as they had 
already been published in FIFA’s annual reports. See e.g. Thomas Kistner, and Jens Wein-
reich, Das Milliardenspiel. Fußball, Geld and Medien (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1998); John 
Sudgden, and Alan Tomlinson, FIFA and the Contest for World Football. Who rules the 
peoples’ game? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). Quoted from the cover blurb of the book 
by John Sugden, and Alan Tomlinson, Great Balls of Fire. How Big Money is Hijacking 
World Football (Edinburgh/London: Mainstream, 1999). 
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benefit the members and their activities.14 It would therefore be more accurate 
to classify FIFA as a cooperative. But this comparison is also unsatisfactory. 
Going beyond the cooperative principle non-members also benefit from surplus 
profits. This is in any case the declared aim of the football development aid 
programme based on article 2 of the FIFA statutes “to promote the game of 
association football in every way it deems fit”. This programme, agreed on by 
the member nations, simultaneously enables FIFA, whose headquarters are in 
Zurich, to profit from Swiss laws exempting public benefit business (Gemein-
nützigkeit) from taxation. 
How is it possible to characterise an organisation that is simultaneously a 
capitalist firm and also a charitable association? In the following I should like 
to argue that there are good reasons to describe FIFA as a Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO). The NGO concept was ‘invented’ by the United Nations 
and comprises all types of voluntary cooperative bodies (associations, societies, 
foundations, unions, committees, clubs, leagues, conferences, etc.), which fulfil 
the following criteria: first, they operate independently of governments and 
pursue cultural, humanitarian and developmental aims; second, they contribute 
to implementing universal standard values, principles and activities with the 
help of an official elite. Where NGOs take up specific issues which are impos-
sible to implement in the face of the principle of the sovereignty of national 
states and therefore operate in a transnational sphere, we can also speak of 
International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs). Prominent examples 
include the International Red Cross, Greenpeace, Amnesty International or 
global organisations covering specific professions, technical questions, indus-
tries, hobbies or sports. All these organisations cooperate with national and 
local social pressure groups, not to speak of other NGOs and INGOs with 
whom they are networked for mutual benefit.15 
Furthermore the United Nations Organisation and its subsidiaries UNESCO 
and UNICEF are important partners for INGOs. For its part the United Nations 
Organisation is also interested in a political dialogue with the INGOs which 
explains why some of them are invited to participate in international negotia-
tions and conferences. FIFA has enjoyed such privileges since the 1990s. It 
maintains licence agreements with the UN and organises sponsorships and 
project partnerships. These include initiatives against racism and child labour 
in the production of footballs (“Red Card to Child Labour”) and – in coopera-
tion with the African Football Confederation and the World Health Organisa-
                                                             
14  Cf. Robert Hettlage, Genossenschaftstheorie und Partizipationsdiskussion (Frankfurt/M.: 
Campus, 1979); Klaus Novy, and Michael Prinz, Illustrierte Geschichte der Gemeinwirt-
schaft. Wirtschaftliche Selbsthilfe in der Arbeiterbewegung (Bonn: Dietz, 1988). 
15  The best overview of NGOs and INGOs is John Boli, and George M. Thomas, eds., Con-
structing World Culture. International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1875 (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
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tion – a campaign entitled “Kick polio out of Africa”. Furthermore FIFA fi-
nances SOS children’s villages and supports them with sporting equipment.16 
In the world of INGOs entrepreneurial dealings are seen as a legitimate 
means to raise the level of an organisation’s material resources, its ability to 
disentangle problems and achieve political aims. The fact that this is sometimes 
detrimental to its prestige and moral authority amongst the general public is 
accepted as the price to be paid.17 In this respect FIFA is not a special case 
amongst INGOs.  
That said, the World Football Association differs from other INGOs in that 
it has remained a membership-based organisation despite its entrepreneurial 
orientation. Most other INGOs are, by contrast, purely executive organs.18 This 
particular feature has now become a problem for FIFA. For income from entre-
preneurial activities has reached such a size that membership fees have been 
reduced to a purely symbolic level. A comparison between the incomes of the 
UN and FIFA underlines this only too clearly. In respect of membership num-
bers the UN is a comparable organisation; it has 200 members while FIFA has 
207. Within UNO 47 members contribute around 99% of the regular budget.19 
By contrast FIFA’s membership subscriptions (and levies for matches) amount 
to less than 1% of its income.20 As a consequence, even relatively wealthy 
member associations receive more money from FIFA than they contribute.21 
Subsequently, and because there is no major association with a power of veto 
                                                             
16  For this FIFA President Joseph S. Blatter was honoured as “International Humanist of the 
Year” by the International League of Humanists in March 2002; see Global News, Soccer-
net, 20 March 2002, online, internet, 11 Dec. 05, available: 
  http://www.soccernet.com/global/news/2002/0320/20020320blatteraward.html. 
17  See Willetts, Peter, “What is a Non-Governmental Organization?”, UNESCO Encyclopedia 
of Life Support Systems, Section 1: Institutional and Infrastructure Resource Issues, Article 
1.44.3.7: Non-Governmental Organizations (also online, internet, 14 Nov. 02, available 
http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM); Ingo Take, “Neue 
Allianzpartner”, Politische Ökologie 72 (2001): special issue “NGOs im Wandel”, 34-36. 
18  See Michael Edwards, and Alan Fowler, “Introduction: Changing Challenges for NGDO 
Management”, The Earthscan Reader on NGO Management, eds. Edwards, and Fowler 
(London: Earthscan, 2002) 1-12, here 2, and Helmut Anheier, and Nuno Themudo, “Füh-
rung und Management von Internationalen Mitgliederorganisationen”, Zivilgesellschaft in-
ternational. Alte und neue NGOs, eds. Christiane Franz, and Annette Zimmer (Opladen: 
Leske & Budrich, 2002) 303-325. 
19  Sven Bernhard Gareis, and Johannes Varwick, Die Vereinten Nationen. Aufgaben, Instru-
mente und Reformen, 2. ed. (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2002) 64. 
20  The FIFA Financial Report 2002 no longer lists membership fees. According to the report 
the fees for games in 1999 amounted to CHF 1.960.327, the total income from events, in 
which income from TV rights and marketing are included comprised CHF 183.018.571. In 
2000 fees amounted to CHF 2.295.082, and the total income from events 681.549.250 (page 
86). 
21  In case they accept these donations - which most of them don’t do. In 2005 only 176 of 207 
were supported by FIFA. Cf. 176 Associations now Benefiting from FIFA Goal Pro-
gramme, in: FIFA-Media Information, online, internet, 24 Dec. 2005 available: 
  http://www.fifa.com/en/media/index/0,1369,111127,00.html. 
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amongst the 207 FIFA members (a further difference to UNO), the Zurich 
headquarters and its professional staff have an extraordinary amount of power 
concentrated in their hands, a fact which erodes the association’s democratic 
basis. I shall return to this problem later. 
On the other hand one of the salient features of INGOs in general is that 
they operate more ‘top-down’ than ‘bottom-up’. Otherwise they would be 
unable to achieve their universal values and uniform standards.22 In FIFA’s 
case the huge amount of power enjoyed by the Zurich headquarters is a further 
important precondition for the productive use of another structural feature: its 
capability to focus its funding. By contrast with the similarly wealthy Interna-
tional Olympic Committee (IOC), which has to serve a great many different 
forms of sport, FIFA only needs to promote football. And by contrast with the 
Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) which is perma-
nently compelled to take account of the interests of the major clubs, FIFA is 
able to devote its funds exclusively to national associations. When business is 
good this can mean cash injections to the order of millions which can provide 
enormous impulses towards development when purposefully applied to specific 
local projects. 
FIFA as a Free-Rider on the Wave of a Global  
Associational Revolution 
Without a doubt FIFA is today one of the most financially powerful Interna-
tional Non-Governmental Organisations. That said it utterly conforms with 
contemporary trends. For all the NGOs and INGOs together can mobilise more 
money for their projects than the whole of the United Nations’ system.23 The 
increase in the number of INGOs alone confirms what a model of success these 
organisations have proved to be in the late 20th century. Around 1900, when 
FIFA came into being, there were only 200 INGOs. In 1930 the number had 
risen to 800, and by 1960 to 2000. After this the rate of growth was enormous. 
During the following twenty years the total doubled to 4000. Between 1980 
and 1990 the speed of growth was even higher with the result that by the early 
                                                             
22  See John Boli, and George M. Thomas, “Introduction”, in: Boli and Thomas, Constructing 
World Culture 1-12, here 5. The argument is explained in greater detail in Georg Krücken, 
“Der ‘world-polity’-Ansatz in der Globalisierungsdiskussion”, Weltkultur. Wie die westli-
chen Prinzipien die Welt durchdringen, John W. Meyer, ed. Georg Krücken (Frankfurt/M.: 
Suhrkamp, 2005) 299-317. 
23  See Leon Gordenker, and Thomas G. Weiss, “NGO Participation in the International Policy 
Process”, NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, eds. Gordenker and Weiss (Boulder: 
Lynne Riener, 1996) 209-222, here 220; Berthold Kuhn, “Zivilgesellschaften aus der Per-
spektive der Entwicklungsländer”, Die Praxis der Zivilgesellschaft. Akteure, Handeln and 
Strukturen im internationalen Vergleich, ed. Arnd Bauerkämper (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 
2003) 391-413, here 405 f. 
 64
1990s there were between 5000 and 6000 INGOs.24 FIFA was a part of this 
worldwide growth of INGOs. As such it developed its organisation “in the 
midst of a global ‘associational revolution’” that, as recent international rela-
tions research has emphasised, “may prove to be as significant to the latter 
twentieth century as the rise of the nation state was to the latter nineteenth”.25 
The associational revolution of the later 20th century had many causes. At 
first it was a reaction to the increased need for private aid which arose as a 
result of cutbacks in state funding all over the world. The global recession and 
financial crises of the 1980s led to a reduction in public expenditure in many 
countries. In some extremely poor regions of Africa, like Somalia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone, the state apparatus and infrastructure even collapsed completely. 
Other countries like Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire were dragged into poverty by 
an overwhelming influx of refugees. In the 1990s the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and its satellite states had conspicuous consequences. Many INGOs 
were now confronted with a huge challenge resulting from the breakdown in 
political systems in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere, not to speak of 
armed conflicts, appalling refugee problems and other emergency situations.26 
In this situation FIFA regarded its football development aid as a flanking con-
tribution to re-establishing social life. At the same time it reacted to the vacuum 
which had been left at the end of the Cold War by the general withdrawal of 
state funding to sport. Whereas the Soviet Union had promoted a deliberate 
policy of sending trainers and other helpers to Africa and Asia in the early 
1970s in order to win over newly founded states in the wake of decolonisation, 
this development aid had been reduced even before the final collapse of the 
Soviet Union when it ceased completely.27 
                                                             
24  Numbers according to John Boli, and George M. Thomas, “INGOs and the Organization of 
World Culture”, Boli and Thomas, Constructing World Culture 13-49, here 14, 20. Mean-
while Boli and Thomas regard only those organisations which have an international mem-
bership and organisation structure as INGOs. If one wished to include all those INGOs 
whose work was generally devoted to international themes there would be as many as 25 to 
30,000 INGOs worldwide - on all continents and spread equally in the industrialised nations 
and the so-called Third World; see Paul Ghils, “International civil society: International 
non-governmental organizations in the international system”, International Social Science 
Journal 133 (1992): 417-431, here 419; Paul Streeten, “Nongovernmental Organizations 
and Development”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
554 (1997): special issue “The Role of NGOs: Charity and Empowerment”, ed. V. Jude L. 
Fernando, and Alan W. Heston (London/New Delhi: Sage, 1997) 193-210, here 195; R.L. 
Stirrat, and Heiko Henkel, “The Development Gift: The Problem of Reciprocity in the 
NGO World”, Fernando and Heston 66-80, here 67. 
25  Lester M. Salamon, “The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector”, Foreign Affairs 73/4 (1994): 109-
122, here 109. 
26  See Marc Lindenberg, and Coralie Bryant, Going Global. Transforming Relief and Devel-
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The associational revolution has not only reacted to massive global emer-
gencies, it has also mirrored the INGOs’ extended radius of action. Between 
1973 and 1989 a considerable number of states in the poor regions of the 
world, especially Latin America, moved from dictatorships to reasonably de-
mocratic forms of government. This opened up new areas of action and above 
all acceptable working conditions for aid organisations. They were now able to 
freely exchange information in order to coordinate activities and create synergy 
effects – a wave of rationalisation measures which were further promoted by 
the more recent global revolution in communications. Satellite telephone con-
nections, the invention of fax machines, and most recently E-Mail and the 
Internet have enormously alleviated the activities of NGOs and INGOs.28 All 
the more so when technical innovations have been used alongside improved 
educational opportunities. Between 1970 and 1985 the quota of adults in Third 
World Countries unable to read and write sank from 57 to 40 % – amongst men 
even to 29 % – and an urban middle-class sprang up for the first time in certain 
Latin-American, African and Asian countries. With the help of their committed 
cooperation the aid organisations have been able to reach populations in sur-
rounding areas much better than before and build permanent links with scat-
tered activists.29 
FIFA as a Trend-Setter 
However, FIFA is not only a free-rider of such improvements of global infra-
structure. Being one of the financially most powerful INGOs, it has also con-
tributed actively to preparing the ground for effectively taking up these new 
possibilities.  
The main step towards this direction was made only recently, in about 2000, 
after FIFA had considerably expanded its development programmes. While 
these programmes had mainly comprised courses of administration, sports 
medicine, refereeing and coaching in the decades before, a new programme 
called “GOAL” provided big sums from the sale of broadcasting rights for the 
financing of the national football associations’ infrastructure: the building of 
headquarters, the employment of professional staff, and the stimulation of 
participation of teams in international competitions. But the most important 
innovation in this context is the new quality of support: The GOAL project 
granted, for the first time, development funds directly to football associations. 
Every association that applied could receive up to one million dollars over a 
three-year period. Havelange’s successor as FIFA president, Joseph S. Blatter, 
                                                                                                                                
Sport, Culture and Politics, eds. J.C. Binfield, and John Stevenson (Sheffield: Academic 
Press, 1993) 113-128.  
28  See Lindenberg and Bryant 8-12, 150. 
29  See Salamon 116 f. 
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took this gamble to demonstrate that money poured directly into the football 
associations could be used in a useful and lasting way and that, far from creat-
ing a new form of corruption, this direct aid would lead national associations to 
become more aware of their responsibilities.30 The purpose of the GOAL pro-
ject is to make associations fit for participation as well as for hosting interna-
tional tournaments.31 
The direct funding also allowed FIFA, if necessary, to monitor the auton-
omy and good working practice of national associations. With this in mind, the 
National Associations Committee mentioned in the introduction was created in 
1999. Its role was not only to intervene into disputes but also to preserve and 
defend the rights of national associations. The Committee provides advice in 
helping member associations to use the money awarded to them to build up a 
modern, efficient system of administration, and observes member associations’ 
elections. Furthermore it actively intervenes in any attempts by governments to 
meddle in associations’ affairs or when a member association falls into difficul-
ties for any other reason. Like the United Nations FIFA finances inspectors and 
inspection trips. The considerable costs are met from the massive source of 
income provided by the selling of media rights.  
FIFA’s inspectors enable the organisation to gain a close and immediate im-
pression of any developments in sporting politics, to try to influence matters in 
a pragmatic fashion and, where necessary, to threaten any association with 
sanctions or even suspension. Since most governments nowadays regard foot-
ball as a matter of prestige such threats have proved extremely effective. All in 
all, during the period between 1999 and 2002 the National Associations Com-
mittee dealt with matters concerning the member associations of ninety-nine 
countries. Most, but not by any means all, of these countries were smaller states 
from the developing nations and Eastern Europe.32  
Redistribution as a Political Problem 
By contrast FIFA is still a long way from solving another of its structural prob-
lems, the building of factions and coalitions within the member associations. 
Such tensions have arisen from the relationships between the headquarters in 
Zurich and the confederations in each of the football continents. The confedera-
tions have come into existence since the end of the Second World War and are 
modelled on the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol (CONMEBOL) which 
was set up in 1916. They are UEFA (founded in 1954), the Asian Football 
Confederation (AFC, 1954), the Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF, 
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1957), the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Associa-
tion Football (CONCACAF, 1961) and the Oceania Football Confederation 
(OFC, 1966). All these organisations are indispensable in mobilising resources 
to regulate conflicts in world football. On the negative side they act on behalf 
of their own regional interests and attempt to push through their own particular 
agendas by using block voting and building inter-confederation coalitions. 
Therefore, as early as the 1950s leading FIFA officials expressed fears that 
regionalisation tendencies in world football – a ‘natural’ corollary to a thriving 
global expansion – might also promote centrifugal tendencies and internal 
factions.33  
By the end of the Havelange era in 1998, when Blatter took over the presi-
dency, it was clear that there was some substance to the fears. As the proactive 
development policies of FIFA as a Non-Governmental Organisation had en-
couraged African and Asian members in particular to articulate their own inter-
ests, the Zurich headquarters found it increasingly difficult to enforce its view-
point in conflicts with the individual confederations. This was, by the way, an 
additional experience that FIFA shared with many other INGOs.34 The situation 
became particularly complicated in the 1990s because the newly founded states 
in Eastern Europe also began to claim their rights. 
To conclude the article I should like to refer to one special type of conflict, 
compounded by two mutually impinging problems, that continues to crop up on 
many occasions. It is in part fuelled by a subconscious antagonism of the con-
federations to the Zurich headquarters and its huge abundance of power. But 
the main reasons can be found in the democratic principle of decision making 
of the FIFA general congresses. Again and again, the democratic principle ‘one 
country – one vote’ emphasises a divergence of interests between UEFA, 
whose influence within world football has been systematically eroded by 
FIFA’s deliberate globalisation policies, and the predominance of the non-
European confederations. Although European countries still make up 63% of 
all registered players and 68% of all the teams in the world and finance the 
organisation over-proportionally, the egalitarian FIFA constitution means that 
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they have no more voting power than the countless ‘paupers’ from the develop-
ing countries who can together make up a majority of votes. In fact, as voting 
procedures are laid down according to countries, European members amount to 
no more than 25% of the total.35 Therefore, unless it can come to a previous 
arrangement with the FIFA headquarters, the European confederation UEFA is 
forced to cooperate with precisely those Third World confederations whose 
influence they would prefer to curb, and this can only lead to unsatisfactory 
results. 
I do not intend to examine these quarrels in detail in this article; they ex-
press themselves in ugly conflicts about personnel and in accusations of cor-
ruption and mismanagement. But I should like to emphasise that these types of 
conflicts are the unavoidable side effects of FIFA turning into a most effective 
International Non-Governmental Organisation during the last three decades. To 
get rid of these conflicts, the World Football Association would have to get rid 
of its democratic system of voting and to turn its back on its developmental 
politics. I am afraid that – as nobody is ready to initiate such a European-about-
turn in FIFA politics – FIFA and its presidents will have to keep struggling 
with this situation. 
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